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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-HABEAS CORPUS-CUSTODY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR 
JURISDICTION-Having exhausted his state remedies1 in seeking a reversal2 
of a 1954 conviction for forgery, petitioner applied in May 1956 for a writ 
of habeas corpus in a federal district court alleging, inter alia, that his con-
viction without benefit of counsel was a denial of due process under the 
fourteenth amendment. After dismissal by that court and affirmance 
1 Exhaustion of state remedies is a prerequisite to issuance of a writ of habeas corpus 
by a federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). 
2 Parker v. State, 276 S.W. 2d 533 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955); Parker v. Ellis, Tex. Crim. 
App. Sept. 21, 1955 (dismissal of petitioner's application for state habeas corpus), cert. 
denied, 850 U.S. 971 (1956). 
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by the court of appeals,3 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in March 
1959. Pending a decision, petitioner completed his sentence and was re-
leased from prison. In a per curiam opinion, held, dismissed, four Justices 
dissenting.4 In a habeas corpus proceeding the Court is without jurisdiction 
if the petitioner is not in custody at the time the judgment will become 
effective. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960). 
It is not only in the jurisprudence of primitive societies that the substan-
tive law is in danger of being "secreted in the interstices of procedure."5 
In the present case, after almost five years of continuous litigation, the ques-
tion whether petitioner's constitutional rights were violated was relegated 
to the "limbo of mootness"6 because the court felt a procedural requirement 
had not been met. That this was an unfortunate result few would deny; 
that it was necessary remains to be seen. 
Due to the case or controversy limitation of article III, section 2, of the 
Constitution it is well settled that the federal courts are unable to decide 
issues unless framed in a setting where the parties are adverse,7 the con-
troversy real,B the interest substantial,9 and the issue justiciable.10 In 
this context, the relevancy of custody in a criminal case relates to the sub-
stantiality of the interest. The Supreme Court has held that a person's 
interest in removing a moral stigma of a criminal conviction is not suffi-
cient to permit the federal judiciary to decide the case,11 but completion of 
the sentence will not render the case moot if it can be shown that collateral 
legal disabilities, such as a denial of voting rights,12 will result from an 
8 Parker v. Ellis, 258 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 359 U.S. 924 (1959). 
4 Justices Harlan and Clark also considered the case moot under the case or con-
troversy requirement of the Constitution because they felt a previous conviction had 
already destroyed petitioner's civil rights and he had not shown any further impairment. 
Chief Justice Warren, joined by Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan, dissented on the 
ground that custody, though necessary to issuance of the writ under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1958), 
is not necesary to the pronouncement of the remedy under 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958), which 
provides that "the Court shall ••. dispose of the matter as law and justice require." Justice 
Douglas, joined by the Chief Justice, also felt that a nunc pro tune judgment was proper 
since the delay was caused by the courts without fault of petitioner. 
5 MAINE, EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM 389 (1882): see BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
(1941); Arnold, Trial by Combat and the New Deal, 47 HARv. L. REv. 913 (1934). 
6 Mr. Chief Justice Warren, principal case at 577. 
7 Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 250 (1850); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 
(1942). 
8 United States v. Evans, 213 U.S. 297 (1909). 
9 Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952): Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 
U.S. 447 (1923). 
10 These terms are not precise and overlap to a great extent; "justiciable," when not 
used tautologically, has a connotation of the traditional and appropriate. E.g., United 
States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567 (1957) (issue prematurely raised); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 
(6 Wall.) 50 (1867) (issue political). See ROBERTSON & KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SU-
PREME COURT OF nm UNITED STATES §§ 257-307 (2d ed. Wolfson&: Kurland 1951); BORCHARD, 
op. cit. supra note 5, at 29-86; Diamond, Federal Jurisdiction To Decide Moot Cases, 94 U. 
PA, L. REv. 125 (1946); Comment, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 772 (1955). 
11 St. Pierre v. United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943). 
12 For a list of other legal consequences, see Note, 59 YALE L.J. 786 (1950). 
314 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 59 
unreversed judgment.13 It is not clear from the opinions whether a specific 
present or impending legal disability must be proved14 or whether it is 
enough to show, when the crime is serious, the mere possibility of future 
collateral legal consequences.15 If the latter view becomes dominant, the 
moral-stigma limitation may serve only to dismiss the frivolous. However, 
the import or wisdom of this distinction is not within the scope of this 
note.16 It is enough to realize that custody is not a constitutional require-
ment for a federal court to exercise jurisdiction.17 
The historic function of the writ of habeas corpus was to prevent de-
tention of persons who had not been convicted by a court of competent 
jurisdiction.18 Normally the person for whom the writ was issued was being 
held without judicial sanction. This circumstance, coupled with the fact 
that during this period there was little judicial concern over the sec-
ondary effects of a judgment, led naturally to the requirement of cus-
tody for the writ to issue.19 However, beginning with Frank v. Mangrum2o 
in 1915, the trial court's jurisdiction was determined not only by the nature 
of the subject matter, but also by the manner in which the trial was con-
ducted. After that decision, lack of jurisdiction of the trial court remained 
a term of pleading, but it became increasingly apparent that the writ would 
issue whenever "the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional 
rights of the accused."21 Although the exact scope of federal inquiry into 
state trials in a habeas corpus proceeding is still a live issue,22 it seems 
reasonably clear that the issues the Court actually considers "are sub-
stantially the same as would be considered on appeal."23 As a result of this 
development, the effect of granting the writ i& not only to release a person 
13 Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 220 (1946); United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 
502, 512 (1953); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 358 (1956). 
14 For attitudes of the circuit courts, see Government of Virgin Islands v. Ferrer, 275 
F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1960); Nevers v. United States, 275 F.2d 332 (8th Cir. 1960); Annot., l L. 
Ed. 2d 1876 (1956). 
15 Indeed, in the principal case the dissenters clearly indicated that they are prepared 
to consider the moral and economic effects. Only Justices Harlan and Clark took issue on 
this point. 
16 For a compilation of state attitudes on this question, see State v. Huffman, 207 Ore. 
372,297 P.2d 831 (1956); Annot., 87 L. Ed. 1201 (1942). 
17 In their concurring opinion, Justices Harlan and Clark did not object to the prin-
ciple but felt no collateral legal consequences had been shown. 
18 Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123 (1906); Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640 (1898). 
10 In fact, the emergence of collateral means for attacking criminal judgments, such as 
habeas corpus and coram nobis, has been instrumental in forcing reconsideration of the 
secondary effects of convictions, for when direct appeal was the only remedy, persons con-
victed of serious crimes would still be in prison when the case reached the appellate court. 
20 237 U.S. 309 (1915). Further expansion occurred in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 
(1923); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). 
21 Whaley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 105 (1942); Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 657 (1948). 
22 Brown v. Allen, supra note 20; Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 98 (1958). 
23 Brown v. Allen, supra note 20, at 540 (concurring opinion of Justice Jackson); see 
Rogge & Gordon, Habeas Corpus, Civil Rights and the Federal System, 20 U. CHI. L. REv. 
509 (1953). 
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from prison, but also to relieve him from the collateral consequences of a 
criminal judgment. Under such circumstances attempts to justify the 
continuation of the custody requirement are valid only to the extent that 
the policy factors which initially militated against the extension of the writ 
beyond its traditional scope continue to have force. Citation of precedent 
from an era when habeas corpus was. a pre-conviction remedy hardly seems 
adequate.24 
The early objections to the expanded use of the writ centered on its 
violation of the policies and principles which underlie the doctrine of res 
judicata, but present attacks emphasize the impropriety of a lower federal 
court challenging the proceedings of a state supreme court and the fear of 
inundating the federal courts with "thousands of groundless, if not fraud-
ulent claims ... .''211 It may be argued that these considerations, while not 
sufficient to outweigh the importance of freeing a man unconstitutionally 
incarcerated, do justify refusing to consider cases where there is no im-
prisonment. Though appealing, this approach is too mechanical. Ad-
mittedly the expansion of the ·writ was possible only because of the belief 
that the freedom of the individual is more important than the dignity 
of the state court or the workload of the federal courts.26 Because the 
writ has developed to the point where there are other constitutionally 
recognized interests involved, the writ should issue unless its issuance would 
further interfere with the opposing policies. So considered, even if it is 
conceded that to remove the custody requirement entirely would place 
too great a burden on state and federal courts,27 it does not follow that a 
writ once applied for may not successfully be pursued despite subsequent 
release of the petitioner from custody. By requiring custody as a condition 
of application, the type and number of claims would be limited as effec-
tively as they are now. Yet by retaining jurisdiction despite a later loss of 
custody, the court can give the same recognition to petitioner's interest 
which it now does on appeal. Although the distinction between the interests 
necessary to invoke the judicial process and those necessary to maintain it 
24 Insistence that its decision was dictated by precedent seems unconvincing from the 
Court which completely rewrote the meaning of jurisdiction in habeas corpus in Moore v. 
Dempsey, supra note 20, and Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 20. 
25 Report of the Habeas Corpus Committee of the Conference of Chief Justices, August 
14, 1951, quoted in Hearings on H. R. 5649 Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 108, 109 (1955). The report is discussed in 
Pollak, Proposals To Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack 
on the Great Writ, 66 YALE, L.J. 50 (1956). Compare Moore v. Dempsey, supra note 20, 
at 92 (dissenting opinion of Justice McReynolds) with Brown v. Allen, supra note 20, at 
532 (concurring opinion of Justice Jackson). 
26 For an evaluation of these considerations, compare Pollak, supra note 25, with Parker, 
Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1949). 
27 However, such considerations have not prevented federal courts from reviewing their 
own judgments even after petitioner has been released from jail. United States v. Morgan, 
supra note 13. Many state courts have a similar practice. State v. Huffman, supra note 17; 
Sanders v. State, 85 Ind. 318, 44 Am. Rep. 29 (1882). 
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has never received articulate judicial recognition,28 the evolution of the 
writ has made such a distinction sound. Indeed, if the adjective law is to 
remain an instrument for balancing the incessant demands of justice and 
finality, this refinement is necessary. 
William C. Griffith 
28 However, the Chief Justice, dissenting in the principal case, was quite articulate in 
defending this position. Compare the "continuing controversy" doctrine of administrative 
law. Southern Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498 (1910); Diamond, supra note 10; 
Comment, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 772 (1955); Note, 40 CoLUM. L. REv. 127 (1940); Note, 53 
L. HARv. L. REv. 628 (1940). 
